Pakistan recorded the highest number of militant attacks in ten years in 2025, unsettling a fragile security equilibrium that had held since 2017. Government data accessed by this correspondent shows over 1,100 violent incidents across the country last year — a nearly 30% increase over 2024 — with the bulk concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Baluchistan, and parts of Punjab. Civilians accounted for an estimated 60% of fatalities, according to unofficial tallies from human rights observers.
While official figures have not been publicly released, security sources familiar with internal assessments warn the situation is “significantly worse” than what has been disclosed.
“We are seeing a tactical reorganization of banned groups along the Afghanistan border. They are exploiting gaps in frontier management and tribal fissures,” said a senior security official who requested anonymity, citing operational sensitivity. “The frequency and lethality of attacks indicate both improved coordination among militant cells and diminishing deterrence.”
According to a compiled dataset of provincial police reports and think-tank estimates:
KP & Tribal Districts: ~480 incidents, with roadside bombings and targeted assassinations up nearly 35% year-on-year.
Balochistan: ~370 security and civilian fatalities tied to insurgent strikes on convoys and infrastructure.
Punjab and Sindh saw some attacks but they were mostly of low intensity.
Human rights groups estimate that over 3,000 Pakistanis died in militant violence in 2025, the highest toll since a peak in 2014.
Academics and analysts argue that the resurgence cannot be attributed to a single cause.
“We must examine the interplay of regional geopolitics, porous borders, and socio-economic deprivation,” said Professor Shehryar Khan, an expert on International Relations at Iqra University Islamabad. “The withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan, the Pakistani Taliban’s reconfiguration, and local grievances in underserved districts have created a perfect storm.”
Professor Shehryar highlighted three critical drivers:
Cross-Border Mobility: Militants exploit gaps in border controls with Afghanistan, especially in remote mountain passes.
Political Fragmentation: Weak political consensus at the centre over counter-insurgency strategy hampers coherent policy.
Socio-Economic Drivers: Decades-long unemployment and lack of services in KP and Balochistan have made youth vulnerable to militant recruitment.
In Bannu district, residents describe a climate of fear that belies official reassurances.
“Shelling and gunfights are almost weekly now. Schools close early. Markets are emptier,” a local shopkeeper said, declining to be named for security reasons. “The army and police try, but the militants move fast.”
The federal government has repeatedly stated that “terrorism is under control,” often citing tactical successes such as the neutralization of high-profile commanders. Yet internal assessments paint a different picture.
“Our focus has been primarily **reactive — clearing an area after an attack — rather than sustained stabilization,” admitted another security official on condition of anonymity. “Intelligence gaps and resource constraints are real.”
One key area of the failure of these operations is the lack of communication
Veteran journalist Dilawar Wazir, who has reported extensively from Pakistan’s tribal districts, believes the problem is not merely operational but political.
“There is a clear communication breakdown between Islamabad and Peshawar,” Wazir said. “In the ongoing Tirah operation, both the federal and provincial governments issued contradictory statements — one claiming the area was cleared, the other warning of continued threats. This inconsistency erodes public trust and creates space for militant propaganda.”
According to Wazir, such contradictions are not new but have intensified over the past few months, particularly after changes in provincial leadership and strained centre-province relations.
“When governments contradict each other, civilians suffer the most,” he said. “People don’t know whether to return to their homes, keep their children out of school, or flee. Militants exploit this confusion by portraying the state as divided and unreliable.”
Residents displaced by recent operations echo these concerns. Several families from Tirah, now sheltering in makeshift camps in Bara and Peshawar outskirts, told this correspondent they received no clear evacuation timelines or rehabilitation assurances.Security analysts warn that lack of unified messaging also weakens morale within law-enforcement agencies operating on the ground.
“Field units rely on clear political direction,” said a former senior intelligence officer, speaking on condition of anonymity. “When the centre and province are not on the same page, operational momentum slows, intelligence sharing suffers, and militants gain breathing space.”
Wazir argues that without repairing centre-province relations, even well-planned military operations risk failing in the long term.
“You cannot defeat militancy with guns alone,” he said. “You need political cohesion, transparency, and trust — both within the state and with the people living in conflict zones. Right now, that trust deficit is widening.”
Critics argue that the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) has limited reach and that coordination among provincial agencies remains weak. A former senior intelligence officer, speaking off the record, remarked, “We lack a unified operational picture. Each agency tracks militants differently, which undermines joint action.”Professor Shehryar advocates a multi-pronged strategy:
Border Management: Strengthen surveillance and local cooperation along the Durand Line with joint mechanisms.
Community Engagement: Empower local jirgas and civil society in conflict zones to reduce militant influence.
Economic Inclusion: Launch targeted economic recovery programs in affected districts with jobs, education, and infrastructure.
“Security operations alone will not solve this,” Shehryar said. “Pakistan needs a long-term stabilization model — one that integrates development, governance, and citizen trust.”
As Pakistan enters 2026, the government faces mounting pressure to recalibrate its counter-insurgency priorities. For many families in KP’s tribal districts or the desert plains of Balochistan, the hope is simple: peace that lasts longer than a news cycle.
Zalmay Azad
The author is an Islamabad-based journalist