The doctrine of “rationality of irrationality,” first articulated by Thomas Schelling, suggests that the projection of unpredictability can enhance deterrence. In the fraught context of India and Pakistan—two nuclear-armed neighbors tethered by geography and haunted by history—this concept assumes a far more combustible dimension. Both states operate deterrence postures steeped in the illusion of controlled escalation, yet history—and hard theory—warn us that even a single tactical nuclear detonation would obliterate the façade of strategic containment.
Bernard Brodie, one of the original theorists of nuclear strategy, emphasized the core feature of nuclear conflict: irreversibility. Once the nuclear threshold is crossed, there is no proportionality, no drawn-out contest of stamina—only catastrophe. Still, in South Asia, a dangerously persistent belief endures—that nuclear use, especially at the tactical level, can be rationalized, localized, or even manipulated for coercive leverage. This is precisely the species of strategic optimism Herman Kahn cautioned against: a delusion that one can choreograph the apocalypse.
Unlike the strategic learning curve of the West—shaped by Hiroshima, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and a complex network of arms control regimes—South Asia’s nuclear architecture remains fragmented and largely derivative. Indian doctrinal thinking, heavily reliant on imported paradigms, often fails to adapt to the region’s unforgiving geography, compressed decision timelines, and ambiguous escalation ladders. Pakistan, by contrast, has long leaned on declaratory deterrence and its Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) doctrine to close conventional asymmetries. Yet it too grapples with the absence of a publicly codified nuclear doctrine tailored to contemporary multi-domain threats.
In 2025, that fragile architecture was tested in real time. What began as a calibrated Indian incursion rapidly metastasized into a multi-domain confrontation involving air, cyber, and missile operations. At the heart of this storm stood Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir—not merely executing doctrine, but reinventing it. His response to the aggression was neither rhetorical nor impulsive. It was doctrinally sober, operationally precise, and psychologically unyielding.
When Indian forces struck military and civilian sites across Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab, Pakistan retaliated with surgical precision. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) downed multiple enemy aircraft—including high-value platforms—while avoiding collateral damage. These were not emotive reprisals; they were calibrated responses designed to signal resolve without triggering uncontrollable escalation. Munir’s conduct during this phase resembled that of a commander walking a tightrope—balancing the imperative of national defense against the abyss of regional annihilation.
India’s subsequent recourse to narrative warfare—issuing fantastical claims of Pakistani attacks on multiple Indian cities—only further underscored its strategic disarray. Yet Pakistan refused to be drawn into an information war. It let empirical evidence do the talking: radar signatures, thermal imagery, and post-strike assessments offered a quiet, devastating rebuttal. Where India tried to put its cards on the table through spectacle, Pakistan countered with restraint—its silence more deafening than its firepower.
The crisis deepened with the launch of three Indian ballistic missiles—two landing near civilian corridors, one intercepted. This was not just a breach of protocol but a psychological gambit aimed at testing red lines. In an environment where decision time is measured in minutes, Field Marshal Munir’s restraint became his most potent signal. He did not retaliate kinetically. He did not escalate verbally. He outmaneuvered conceptually. He signaled command clarity through silence—a masterstroke in nuclear signaling, suggesting that the ball was now firmly in the adversary’s court.
This was not a man shackled by hesitation, but one strategically leveraging ambiguity. In South Asia, where deterrence is not doctrine alone but posture and perception, his handling of the missile incident transformed Pakistan’s restraint into an act of strategic dominance. The adversary had attempted to open Pandora’s box; Munir ensured it was closed without letting the worst spill out.
But the conflict also exposed a deeper dilemma: the limitations of Pakistan’s “quid pro quo plus” doctrine. Designed to raise the cost of Indian adventurism through disproportionate response, it has undoubtedly deterred full-scale war. Yet it has failed to prevent repeated, limited engagements—each one normalizing escalation and compressing the space between conventional and nuclear thresholds.
India’s calculated incursions—Uri, Balakot, and now Pahalgam—reflect a shift toward grey-zone warfare—operations designed to fall below the threshold of full-scale war while achieving strategic effect. But this illusion of control is brittle. It is, in essence, a house of cards—one misstep away from collapse. This is not just operational evolution—it is a doctrinal gamble that bets on rationality enduring under duress. But as deterrence theorists have long cautioned, wars rarely unfold according to textbook logic. In the heat of misperception, miscommunication, or mechanical error, even the best-laid doctrines can unravel.
Here lies the brilliance of Munir’s strategy: he did not mirror India’s aggression tit for tat. He denied the adversary escalation dominance. He imposed reputational costs without altering the nuclear calculus. And in doing so, he preserved deterrence without breaking the back of diplomacy. This was nuclear brinkmanship reimagined—not as a contest of madness, but a discipline of restraint.
International actors, initially skeptical, gradually recalibrated. Key diplomatic interlocutors acknowledged Pakistan’s professional conduct and Munir’s doctrinal command. Strategic intelligence assessments concluded that Islamabad’s composure and doctrinal clarity averted a broader conflagration by virtue of its command integrity, multi-domain coherence, and credible second-strike assurance.
India, meanwhile, found itself rhetorically embattled and strategically exposed. The downing of high-end platforms—Rafales, Su-30s, Herons—was not just a tactical loss. It was a symbolic defeat that undermined New Delhi’s escalation logic. Its attempts to recast the crisis as a counter-terrorism operation collapsed under the weight of battlefield realities and narrative implosion.
As the dust settled, what emerged was not simply a ceasefire—but a strategic reset. Pakistan had not only weathered the storm; it had recalibrated the regional deterrence architecture. The credibility of its deterrent remains intact. Its nuclear threshold, untested, but made unmistakably firm through calibrated restraint. And its military, under Field Marshal Munir’s command, has demonstrated that in an era where seconds matter and stories shape battles, the greatest strength is not the loudest threat—but the quietest resolve.
South Asia has entered a new deterrence epoch—one defined not by megaton payloads, but by microsecond decisions and cognitive dominance. The storm may yet return. But should it come, Pakistan stands ready—not for spectacle, but for strategy. And if another crisis beckons, it will be met by a leadership that knows precisely when to draw a line in the sand—and how to do so without crossing it.
Imran Nasir Shaikh
Imran Nasir Sheikh is a seasoned naval aviator with extensive operational experience in maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare. He is currently pursuing a PhD in Defence and Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, where his research focuses on the nuclear threat dynamics in the Indian Ocean Region, particularly in relation to the evolving strategic landscape and maritime security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). His work explores the intersection of undersea deterrence, regional power projection, and sea-based stability mechanisms in a contested littoral environment.
Asim Riaz
Asim Riaz holds an M.Phil in Strategic Studies from the National Defence University, Islamabad, with degrees in Energy Management and Mechanical Engineering. With a distinguished career spanning over 20 years, he brings expertise in the energy sector, geopolitics, and addressing non-traditional security threats. He is currently serving as Energy Advisor at APTMA, Islamabad.
Email: asimaptma@gmail.com