The signing of a defence cooperation agreement between Pakistan and Somalia is more than a routine military partnership. It represents Islamabad’s latest effort to expand its strategic footprint beyond South Asia and deepen its presence in one of the world’s most contested geopolitical regions—the Horn of Africa.
Located along the approaches to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Somalia occupies a position of immense strategic importance. Nearly all maritime traffic moving between Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal passes this narrow waterway, making stability in the region critical to global commerce, energy flows and naval operations. As competition intensifies among regional and international powers for influence across the Red Sea corridor, Pakistan’s growing engagement with Somalia places Islamabad within a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape that links the Middle East, East Africa and the Indian Ocean.
The memorandum of understanding signed in Islamabad by Somali Defence Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi and Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif institutionalizes cooperation in military training, counter-terrorism, professional education and defence capability development. While the agreement does not include military basing rights, force deployments or weapons transfers, it establishes the framework through which Pakistan can gradually cultivate long-term influence within Somalia’s emerging security architecture.
For Islamabad, the agreement complements a broader foreign policy trend that increasingly relies on defence diplomacy, military training and security cooperation to expand strategic relationships. Rather than projecting power through overseas bases, Pakistan has sought to build influence through military education, training missions and defence-industrial partnerships. Somalia offers an opportunity to apply this model in a region that sits at the crossroads of Gulf security dynamics, African geopolitics and Indian Ocean competition.
The Horn of Africa has become an arena where multiple powers pursue overlapping strategic interests. Turkey has established itself as Somalia’s most prominent security partner through training programmes and military assistance. Gulf states continue to
compete for economic and political influence across the Red Sea basin, while China, the United States and European powers maintain significant military and maritime interests in the wider region. Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s entry adds another layer to an increasingly complex security environment.
For Somalia, the partnership reflects a deliberate strategy of diversifying security relationships. After decades of conflict and state fragmentation, Mogadishu is attempting to rebuild national defence institutions while avoiding excessive dependence on any single external patron. Cooperation with Pakistan provides access to military expertise and
professional training while expanding Somalia’s diplomatic options as it balances relationships with Turkey, Qatar, Gulf partners and Western security actors.
The agreement’s geopolitical significance is magnified by ongoing instability around the Red Sea. Attacks on commercial shipping, regional conflicts and growing great-power competition have highlighted the vulnerability of maritime trade routes connecting Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Any country capable of contributing to maritime security and military capacity-building along these corridors gains strategic relevance disproportionate to the scale of its direct involvement.
Counter-terrorism remains the immediate driver of cooperation. Somalia continues to face a persistent insurgency from Al-Shabaab, while the gradual transition away from externally supported security operations places greater responsibility on Somali forces. Pakistan’s experience in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns could provide valuable institutional lessons for Somali military development. Yet the deeper significance lies not in tactical training alone, but in the long-term relationships created through officer education, doctrinal exchanges and professional military networks.
History shows that defence partnerships often generate influence through institutions rather than deployments. Officers trained abroad frequently maintain enduring professional ties with their host countries, shaping procurement decisions, operational concepts and strategic outlooks for decades. If Somali personnel increasingly pass through Pakistani military academies and staff colleges, Islamabad could gain a degree of strategic influence that extends far beyond the immediate scope of the memorandum.
Reports linking the partnership to potential Somali interest in acquiring JF-17 Thunder Block III fighters have further fuelled speculation about Pakistan’s expanding role in Africa. exploratory discussions underscore Pakistan’s ambition to position itself as an emerging defence exporter capable of competing in new markets. A future JF-17 deal would not simply involve aircraft sales; it would create long-term dependencies in training,
maintenance, logistics and technical support, embedding Pakistan more deeply within Somalia’s defence ecosystem.
JF-17 Block III Reports and Somalia’s Airpower Aspirations
Reports suggesting that Somalia is considering the acquisition of approximately 24 JF-17 Thunder Block III fighter aircraft have drawn significant international attention. If realised, such a procurement would mark the most ambitious revival of Somali combat aviation in decades.
The reported package value of around US$900 million reflects only the most visible aspect of the potential acquisition. The true cost would likely be considerably higher if it includes a comprehensive support package encompassing advanced munitions, flight simulators, spare parts, pilot and technician training, infrastructure upgrades, technical assistance, and long-term operational sustainment.
Saudi Arabia and Qatar are reportedly expected to finance approximately 65 percent of the overall program through sovereign-backed funding mechanisms. The remaining 35 percent is anticipated to be shared between Turkey and Somalia, with Ankara playing a central role as Mogadishu’s principal strategic and defense partner in the initiative.
While the JF-17 Block III would provide Somalia with a modern multirole fighter capability, the effectiveness of such a force would depend on a broader military ecosystem. Critical enablers include reliable radar networks, secure command-and-control systems, trained air-defense personnel, mission-planning infrastructure, adequate weapons inventories, and resilient airbases capable of sustaining combat operations.
Beyond the aircraft themselves, maintaining a fleet of 24 fighters would require a large cadre of skilled personnel, including pilots, engineers, weapons technicians, air-traffic controllers, intelligence analysts, and base-security forces. Developing and sustaining this institutional capacity could prove more challenging than financing the aircraft acquisition itself.
Somalia’s ongoing counter-terrorism operations continue to create demand for intelligence, surveillance, and precision-strike capabilities. However, the introduction of a modern fighter force would also expand the country’s strategic responsibilities, including airspace protection, sovereignty enforcement, and regional deterrence. Balancing these objectives against competing priorities such as ground-force modernisation, helicopter fleets, and intelligence capabilities would be a key consideration for policymakers.
Nevertheless, caution is warranted. The memorandum remains an enabling framework rather than evidence of a major strategic realignment. No publicly disclosed provisions indicate military facilities, operational deployments or exclusive security arrangements. The agreement’s ultimate significance will depend on implementation, funding and sustained political commitment from both governments.
What is clear, however, is that the Pakistan–Somalia partnership reflects a broader geopolitical reality: influence in the twenty-first century is increasingly built through networks of training, security cooperation and institutional engagement rather than
territorial presence alone. By establishing a foothold in Somalia’s defence sector, Pakistan is positioning itself within a strategically vital region whose importance will continue to grow as competition over the Red Sea and Indian Ocean intensifies.
The agreement may not transform the regional balance of power overnight, but it signals Islamabad’s intention to become a more active player in the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa—an area that sits at the intersection of global trade, maritime security and emerging geopolitical competition.
Yousaf Khan : The author is a defence expert with deep insight in phenomenal developments taking place in field of defence. He is a regular column writer for NEWSMAN. He can be reached out at :
Mykhan10@yahoo.com